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Metaphors are common elements of language that allow us to creatively stretch the
limits of word meaning. However, metaphors vary in their degree of novelty, which
determines whether people must create new meanings on-line or retrieve previously
known metaphorical meanings from memory. Such variations affect the degree to
which general cognitive capacities such as executive control are required for successful
comprehension. We investigated whether individual differences in executive control
relate to metaphor processing using eye movement measures of reading. Thirty-nine
participants read sentences including metaphors or idioms, another form of figurative
language that is more likely to rely on meaning retrieval. They also completed the AX-CPT,
a domain-general executive control task. In Experiment 1, we examined sentences
containing metaphorical or literal uses of verbs, presented with or without prior context. In
Experiment 2, we examined sentences containing idioms or literal phrases for the same
participants to determine whether the link to executive control was qualitatively similar
or different to Experiment 1. When metaphors were low familiar, all people read verbs
used as metaphors more slowly than verbs used literally (this difference was smaller for
high familiar metaphors). Executive control capacity modulated this pattern in that high
executive control readers spent more time reading verbs when a prior context forced a
particular interpretation (metaphorical or literal), and they had faster total metaphor reading
times when there was a prior context. Interestingly, executive control did not relate to
idiom processing for the same readers. Here, all readers had faster total reading times for
high familiar idioms than literal phrases. Thus, executive control relates to metaphor but
not idiom processing for these readers, and for the particular metaphor and idiom reading
manipulations presented.
Keywords: metaphor, idioms, executive control, eye movements, sentence reading, context
INTRODUCTION
Many instances of language incorporate metaphorical uses of
words, some of which are familiar but some of which are unfa-
miliar. Consider The students grasped the concept, where the verb
grasp refers to taking hold of something conceptually rather than
physically (its literal interpretation). Such common metaphors
may generally go unnoticed. Indeed, when familiarity is high,
comprehension may simply proceed by retrieving this familiar
metaphoric meaning from memory, in the same way compre-
hension normally proceeds for other types of figurative language,
such as idioms (e.g., Libben and Titone, 2008; Titone et al.,
2014). In contrast, consider The textbooks snored on the deskwhere
snore means “to go unused,” which is metaphorically related to
its typical literal meaning, “the sound one makes when one is
asleep.” Here, the metaphorical meaning is not as familiar as it
was for grasp, thus, the mental effort required to comprehend this
sentence may increase because its intended metaphorical mean-
ing must be generated in the moment (Kintsch, 2000; Kazmerski
et al., 2003; Cardillo et al., 2012).
In this study, we investigated whether individual differences in
general cognitive capacities, specifically domain-general executive
control, relate to metaphor processing. Moreover, we examined
this relationship as a function of metaphor familiarity and other
factors relevant to on-line comprehension, such as prior con-
textual constraint, which may or may not force a metaphorical
interpretation. We also investigated, for the same participants,
whether a relationship between executive control and compre-
hension extends to another class of figurative language, idioms,
which are likely to be more lexicalized than metaphors, and thus
amenable to rapid retrieval from memory. As will be seen, our
main conclusion is that individual differences in executive control
are indeed important for metaphor processing, in a way that
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varies with familiarity and prior contextual support, and that
potentially differs from idioms.
Most psycholinguistic studies of metaphor have investigated
nominal metaphors, such as My lawyer is a shark, for which some
semantic features of the vehicle shark (e.g., viciousness) but not
others (e.g., marine animal) are attributed to the topic lawyer.
While it is debated whether this process occurs through category
attribution (Glucksberg, 2001, 2003), shared feature comparison
(Bowdle and Gentner, 2005), or feature attribution via a multidi-
mensional semantic network search (Kintsch, 2000, 2001; Kintsch
and Bowles, 2002), virtually all agree that metaphor understand-
ing depends on the accumulation of one’s past experience with
particular metaphoric forms—that is, their familiarity.
Indeed, all theoretical accounts would posit that metaphor
comprehension should be faster and more accurate when
metaphors are familiar when they are unfamiliar. In the cate-
gory attribution view (Glucksberg, 2001, 2003), this would arise
because people directly retrieve familiar metaphoric features, and
easily suppress irrelevant features. In the feature alignment view
(Bowdle and Gentner, 2005), this would arise because famil-
iar senses of metaphors tend to become integrated over time
with the literal word (see also Kintsch, 2000). Consistent with
these views, the figurative meanings of familiar vs. unfamiliar
metaphors are primed more quickly (Blasko and Connine, 1993),
are judged more quickly in phrasal classification tasks (Mashal
and Faust, 2009; Goldstein et al., 2012), and undergo a less com-
putationally intensive comparison process (Goldstein et al., 2012;
Lai and Curran, 2013; Mashal, 2013). This leads to faster read-
ing and reaction times (Blasko and Connine, 1993; Blasko and
Briihl, 1997; Mashal and Faust, 2009; Lai and Curran, 2013), and
increased accuracy (Goldstein et al., 2012; Mashal, 2013).
Moreover, some researchers have emphasized how metaphori-
cal knowledge evolves over time by examining, for example, how
unfamiliar metaphors can experimentally be made more familiar
through repeated exposure (Cardillo et al., 2012; Goldstein et al.,
2012). Similarly, some have posited that the figurative meanings
of familiar metaphors become lexicalized over time (i.e., they
turn into “dead” metaphors, Bowdle and Gentner, 2005), with
their component words becomingmore polysemous as familiarity
increases over time (Glucksberg, 2001, 2003). For these reasons,
our understanding of metaphor processing may relate to other
work on single word polysemy or homonymy (e.g., Rayner and
Frazier, 1989; Frazier and Rayner, 1990; Frisson and Pickering,
1999; Pickering and Frisson, 2001; Klepousniotou et al., 2008),
where the crucial question is how selection occurs when multiple
meanings are activated.
Of note, several studies have suggested that resolving lexi-
cal ambiguity requires increased executive or cognitive control
compared to what is required for comprehending unambiguous
words (e.g., Gernsbacher and Faust, 1991; Miyake et al., 1994;
Gernsbacher and Robertson, 1995; Wagner and Gunter, 2004).
Executive control refers to the cognitive skills that govern plan-
ning, working memory, and selective attention (Miyake et al.,
2000; Karbach and Kray, 2009), which are thought to rely on
intact frontal lobe function (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000; Braver
et al., 2001). Gernsbacher and Faust (1991; see also Gernsbacher
et al., 1990) showed that readers with low comprehension skill
(a potential proxy for low executive control) were less capable
of inhibiting inappropriate interpretations of lexically ambigu-
ous words (e.g., deciding that ace is not related to He dug with a
spade). Similar results were found in other work for comprehen-
ders with low reading spans, often taken as a measure of working
memory (Gunter et al., 2003; Wagner and Gunter, 2004). For
example, Miyake et al. (1994) found that readers with low reading
spans took longer to read late-occurring disambiguating contexts
when the interpretation was unfamiliar or unexpected, suggesting
that working memory was necessary to keep both interpreta-
tions active until later disambiguating information arrived. These
studies are noteworthy in highlighting how a biased context
can change what may be considered optimal within a particu-
lar comprehension situation. Accordingly, when a prior context is
unbiased, the optimal comprehension strategy might be to main-
tain activation of multiple word meanings or senses in working
memory until subsequent disambiguating information arrives. In
contrast, when a prior context is biased, the optimal comprehen-
sion strategy might be to immediately select or commit to the
contextually relevant interpretation of a word’s meaning or sense
(e.g., Frazier and Rayner, 1990; Frisson and Pickering, 1999).
Given the potential relation between general cognitive capac-
ities and single-word ambiguity resolution, it is reasonable to
expect that executive control should also be important for
metaphor processing, and indeed, the literature provides some
support for this hypothesis. With respect to metaphors and exec-
utive control specifically, Chiappe and Chiappe (2007) showed
that people with better inhibitory skills (measured by reverse digit
span) produced more accurate metaphor interpretations than
those with lower skills. Similarly, Kazmerski et al. (2003) found
that high-IQ participants (where IQ was correlated with both
working memory and vocabulary performance) were more likely
to automatically compute metaphorical meanings than low-IQ
participants. High-IQ participants also gave better interpretations
for metaphors in a subsequent task. In a neuroimaging study,
Prat et al. (2012) found that individuals with low vocabulary and
working memory performance showed greater activation in the
right inferior and middle frontal gyri when processing nominal
metaphors (e.g., He is a prince), especially those in biased vs.
neutral contexts. These findings cohere with other evidence show-
ing that individuals with executive control deficits (e.g., people
with schizophrenia) have difficulties processing metaphors (e.g.,
Mashal et al., 2013).
The role of executive control may be especially important for
unfamiliar metaphors. Consistent with this idea, Mashal et al.
(2007) found that unfamiliar two-word metaphors (e.g., sweet
sleep) led to greater neural activation in frontal brain regions
(the left middle frontal gyrus, right inferior frontal gyrus, and
right posterior superior temporal sulcus) compared to famil-
iar metaphors and literal phrases. In another study, Mashal
(2013) found that people with larger reverse digit spans had
better recall, comprehension, and recognition for unfamiliar
metaphors compared to unrelated word pairs. Such results are
consistent with those of Gernsbacher and Robertson (1995) and
Gernsbacher et al. (2001), showing that the need to actively sup-
press metaphor-irrelevant features in a behavioral task was critical
for comprehension.
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Thus, several sources of evidence suggest that executive control
demands during metaphor processing should differ as a func-
tion of familiarity and prior context, however, several questions
remain. First, while prior work has investigated how individual
differences relate to metaphor processing, this work often con-
flates more than one kind of individual difference simultaneously
(e.g., reading span tasks, where performance is based on lan-
guage processing, vocabulary knowledge, and working memory
capacity). Indeed, the majority of tests in the literature have been
verbal and language-based in nature (e.g., reading span), thus
making it unclear whether domain-general aspects of executive
control relate to performance. Second, although previous work
has shown that executive control is necessary for resolving lexi-
cal ambiguity, to our knowledge no study has investigated how
both familiarity and context jointly influence executive control
demands during metaphor processing. Finally, past studies have
investigated metaphors presented in isolation (e.g., Mashal et al.,
2007; Mashal and Faust, 2009; Goldstein et al., 2012; Mashal,
2013) or used secondary tasks, which could compromise the nat-
uralness of comprehension (e.g., Kazmerski et al., 2003; Pierce
et al., 2010; Goldstein et al., 2012; Lai and Curran, 2013).
The present study thus addresses some of these limitations
in a sentence reading experiment where participants’ eye move-
ments are recorded as they naturally read sentences containing
metaphors. With respect to assessing individual differences in
executive control, we used a well-studied domain-general execu-
tive control task (AX-CPT, e.g., Braver et al., 2001). Specifically,
we examined different aspects of the eye movement record to
determine exactly when executive control is necessary for com-
puting a metaphorical meaning during the time course of read-
ing, and how that varies as a function of the familiarity of the
metaphors in question, and of the degree of contextual support
provided by the sentence.
To these ends, in Experiment 1, we created sentences con-
taining metaphors that hinged on a metaphoric interpretation of
individual verbs (i.e., predicate metaphors), as well as literal sen-
tences using the same verbs. All sentences had the same structure
consisting of subject noun, verb, disambiguating context and neu-
tral ending (e.g., The textbook snored on the desk at the end of the
day). Each sentence could also have a context word prior to the
subject noun that either biased a metaphorical or literal interpre-
tation of the verb (e.g., The unopened textbooks snored on the desk
at the end of the day). Our eye movement measures assessed how
long people read the critical verb region in terms of first pass read-
ing, and the whole metaphor region (i.e., noun + verb) in terms
of total reading time, thus incorporating fixations occurring after
readers had encountered a later disambiguating context (which
should indicate whether the verb should have been interpreted
metaphorically or literally). This allowed us to construct a time-
course ranging from early to late, enabling us to assess whether
individual differences in executive control differentially related to
different points of this time-course.
When there was no prior context, we expected that readers
would delay committing to a metaphorical interpretation of the
verb at the point of the verb (e.g., snored), as has been found in
prior work on polysemous verbs (Pickering and Frisson, 2001).
However, we generally expected that a prior context that biased
a specific interpretation of the verb (e.g., unopened textbooks)
would cause readers to commit to the contextually appropriate
interpretation. Of note, we expected that these general effects
would be modulated by both metaphor familiarity and individual
differences in executive control.
In Experiment 2, we extended the results of Experiment 1 by
examining another class of figurative language that is likely to be
more lexicalized or familiar than metaphors—idiomatic expres-
sions. Idioms have whole meanings that go beyond the combi-
nation of the literal meanings (i.e., kick the bucket is not related
to the act of kicking nor to a pail), and can be accessed from
memory as a single lexical item, while also activating the lexical
meanings of the component words (Libben and Titone, 2008).
Idioms therefore have meaning ambiguity at the word level,
like metaphors, but occur in more predictable word configura-
tions than metaphors, thus functioning to a greater extent than
metaphors as highly familiar lexicalized entities. Thus, we gener-
ally expected that idioms, unlike metaphors, would not show a
strong relation to individual differences in executive control.
EXPERIMENT 1: METAPHOR PROCESSING AND EXECUTIVE
CONTROL
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-six native speakers of English participated for course credit
or compensation of $10/h. All participants were from the McGill
or Montreal community, had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and no self-reported history of speech or hearing disorders
with a mean age of 22.74 (SD = 2.73) and a mean of 16.3 years of
education (SD = 2.0).
Stimuli
We created sentences containing metaphors and literal sentences
of the type described above, e.g., The textbook snored on the desk
at the end of the day; The sailor snored in the hammock at the end of
the day; The unopened textbooks snored on the desk at the end of the
day; The tired sailor snored in the hammock at the end of the day.
The stimulus set consisted of 256 sentences, which included
64 unique verbs, taken from a larger set of metaphors devel-
oped by Cardillo et al. (2010). Cardillo et al. normed these verbs
in their metaphorical or literal sentences for literalness, figu-
rativeness, plausibility, naturalness, imageability, frequency and
interpretability. We modified the Cardillo et al. sentences by
adding a neutral continuation (e.g., The textbook snored on the
desk at the end of the day). This ensured that neither the verb
nor the disambiguating context region was sentence-final.We also
modified the sentences by presenting them in two conditions:
With an adjective providing context prior to the topic noun of
the sentence, or without a prior context (see Table 1).
Because we modified the original Cardillo et al. (2010) sen-
tences, we conducted our own normative study to assess famil-
iarity of the literal and metaphorical uses of the verbs. We asked
23 native English speakers (none of whom participated in the
sentence reading task) to rate how familiar the verb was on a
seven-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all familiar, 7 = Very highly
familiar) for its use (literal or metaphor) in its specific context.
The surveys contained sentences for the full set of 64 verbs, but
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Table 1 | Example sentences from metaphor, literal and with or
without modifier conditions.
Condition Sentence
Metaphor—Low familiar The textbooks snored on the desk
at the end of the day
Metaphor with context—Low familiar The unopened textbooks snored
on the desk at the end of the day
Literal—Low familiar The sailor snored in the hammock
at the end of the day
Literal with context—Low familiar The tired sailor snored in the
hammock at the end of the day
Metaphor—High familiar The model flitted between hair
colors all the time
Metaphor with context—High familiar The fickle model flitted between
hair colors all the time
Literal—High familiar The butterfly flitted between
flower blossoms all the time
Literal with context—High familiar The acrobatic butterfly flitted
between flower blossoms all the
time
were divided into two versions so that participants only rated
either the literal ormetaphorical use of each verb. Each survey was
presented in one of two pseudo-randomly ordered lists. Thus, 12
participants rated one version, and 11 participants rated a second
version.We then calculated a global familiarity score for each verb
by creating a ratio of average metaphoric to literal ratings. Across
items, this ratio ranged from 0.71 to 1.19 (mean = 0.98), where a
value of 1 indicated that the metaphorical and literal sense of the
verb were equally familiar, values greater than 1 indicated that the
metaphorical sense was more familiar than the literal sense, and
values less than 1 indicated that the metaphorical sense was less
familiar than the literal sense. This ratio allowed us to determine
relative metaphor vs. literal familiarity.
Apparatus
We used an Eye-Link 1000 tower mounted system (SR-
Research™, Ontario, Canada) that sampled eye position every
millisecond. Viewing was binocular but eye movements were
recorded from the right eye only, using a head rest. Stimuli were
presented on a 21′′ ViewSonic CRT monitor with a screen resolu-
tion of 1024 × 768 pixels, using EyeTrack 7.10 software developed
at UMass Amherst (blogs.umass.edu/eyelab/software). Text was
presented on a single line in yellow 10-point Monaco font on a
black background. Three characters subtended approximately 1◦
of visual angle.
Procedure
The research was carried out with the approval of the McGill
University Research Ethics Board. Participants completed a lan-
guage background questionnaire before the reading task. Eye
movements were calibrated using a nine-point grid. The verb-
context pairings were presented once in each of six counterbal-
anced lists, such that if a participant viewed the metaphor The
textbook snored on the desk at the end of the day, s/he would not
see the same sentence with the added adjective (The unopened
textbook snored on the desk at the end of the day); nor would s/he
see the literal counterparts of the metaphor stimuli of their list
(The [tired] sailor snored in the hammock at the end of the day).
No participant saw the same metaphor or literal sentence more
than once.
In addition to the experimental sentences, participants also
read 16 practice sentences, for a total of 80 stimulus sentences
in each list, and 54 trials belonging to a second experiment (see
Experiment 2). All stimuli were randomly presented. Practice
sentences could be figurative or literal. Eight occurred at the
beginning of the reading task and eight occurred after a rest break
at the midway point. Twenty-two percent of trials were followed
by yes-no comprehension questions.
After the main sentence reading task, participants completed
an executive control task consisting of the AX-CPT task (Braver
et al., 2001). This task uses letter stimuli, but as they are symbolic
and not dependent on language processing, the task is domain-
general. In this task, participants saw letters one at a time in the
center of the screen, and were instructed to press one button when
an “X” immediately followed an “A,” and to press another but-
ton for all other trials. “AX” target trials occurred in 70% of all
trials (total trials = 430), and the remaining 30% of trials were
comprised of each of three non-target letter combinations (10%
each). Thus, the easiest non-target condition was “BY,” which
provides a baseline for comparison of the other non-target trials.
Here, “B” stands for any letter which is not “A,” and “Y” stands
for any letter that is not “X.” Our measure of interest was based
on the “BX” trials because encountering the “X” for these trials
would trigger a pre-potent tendency to push the button indicated
for target “AX” responses rather than non-target responses. This
difficulty is thought of as reactive control. Because of the a pri-
ori similarity between the processes involved in reactive control
and what we expect to be required during metaphor interpre-
tation (i.e., suppressing a pre-potent tendency to interpret the
words of a metaphor literally), we derived a cost score for each
participant based on the millisecond difference between the aver-
age correct reaction times for BY from the average correct reaction
times for BX.
RESULTS
Overall comprehension question accuracy was 96.4%, indicating
that participants performed the language task well. Eye move-
ment data were analyzed using linear mixed effects (LME)models
(lme4 package, version 0.999999-2; Bates et al., 2013, in the R
Project for Statistical Computing environment, version 3.0.2; R
Development Core Team, 2013). One important reason for using
LME over traditional statistics is that it allows us to investigate
continuous variables that are based on subject-related differences
(e.g., executive control costs) and item-related differences (e.g.,
familiarity ratings for metaphors or idioms). This kind of analy-
sis cannot be easily accomplished using traditional ANOVA (see
Baayen et al., 2008, for a more detailed account of the ratio-
nale for using LME). To index early cognitive processes, such as
lexical access, and later cognitive processes, such as semantic inte-
gration (Rayner, 1998, 2009; Rayner et al., 2012), we analyzed
gaze duration (the sum of all fixation durations during the first
pass) of the verb (Verb GD), and total reading time (the sum of
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Table 2 | Means and standard deviations for median split familiarity
and executive function in Experiment 1.
Variable Mean Min Max SD
Low familiarity (metaphor vs. literal use ratio) 0.93 0.71 0.98 0.06
High familiarity (metaphor vs. literal use ratio) 1.03 0.98 1.19 0.04
Low executive control (cost score in ms) 119 35 339 83
High executive control (cost score in ms) −19 −105 31 41
all fixation durations) of the whole metaphor region (Metaphor
TRT), respectively. Thus, for the sentence The [unopened] text-
book snored on the desk at the end of the day, we analyzed Verb GD
for snored, and Metaphor TRT for textbook snored.
We fit LME models to each eye movement measure. In each
model, familiarity (i.e., metaphor/literal familiarity ratio; contin-
uous), executive control (continuous), context (with or without
prior context), and condition (metaphor or literal) were fixed
effects. Categorical predictors were deviation coded except where
noted otherwise, and all continuous predictors were scaled to
reduce collinearity. Maximum correlations among main effects
were <0.16 for each main model. Subjects and items (sen-
tences) were random intercepts across the models; random slopes
were included in models only when they were statistically war-
ranted (cf. Baayen et al., 2008; Barr et al., 2013). In addition,
for consistency across models, we computed p-values using the
number of model terms minus one for the degrees of freedom.
All model formulae were near-identical in that they included
a four-way interaction term for familiarity ratio ∗executive
control∗context∗condition. For ease of data interpretation, we
present the means and standard deviations for all continuous
factors in Table 2, with familiarity ratio and executive control
median split (recall, they were treated as continuous variables in
all models).
Verb GD
We removed extreme outliers (Verb GD < 80ms or > 2000ms)
from the dataset, retaining 94.3% of observations. Stepwise log
likelihood model comparisons showed that by-subject and by-
item random slopes were not warranted for categorical variables
in this model. Subject-averaged (F1) means broken down by
metaphor condition, familiarity ratio, and context are presented
in Figure 1. The full model is presented in Table 3.
We found a significant interaction between condition and
familiarity ratio (b = −0.04, SE = 0.02, p < 0.05), indicating
that verbs used in a metaphorical sentence had longer gaze dura-
tions than the same verbs used in a literal sentence to the extent
that they were low familiar. To further assess the source and direc-
tion of this interaction, we computed sub-models where the data
were median split into high and low metaphor-literal familiar-
ity ratios. Readers’ Verb GD were longer for low familiar verbs
in metaphor sentences (e.g., The textbook snored on the desk at
the end of the day) compared to low familiar verbs in literal sen-
tences (e.g., The sailor snored in the hammock at the end of the day)
(b = 0.08, SE = 0.02, p < 0.001); there were no significant effects
for high familiar metaphor verbs. Thus, it is likely that readers
considered high familiarity ratio verbs to be ambiguous in terms
FIGURE 1 | Context and familiarity subject-averaged (F1) mean reading
times (ms) for Verb GD. Error bars show standard error of the mean.
Table 3 | Effect sizes (b), standard errors (SE ), and p-values for the
verb gaze duration logistic LME model.
Fixed effects Verb gaze duration
b SE p
Condition 0.02 0.02 0.16
Prior context 0.04 0.02 0.01*
Familiarity ratio (scaled) 0.03 0.01 0.06
Executive control score (scaled) 0.04 0.03 0.16
Condition*Prior context −0.03 0.03 0.40
Condition*Familiarity −0.04 0.02 0.01*
Prior context*Familiarity 0.01 0.02 0.56
Condition*Executive control 0.00 0.02 0.87
Prior context*Executive control −0.04 0.02 0.02*
Familiarity*Executive control 0.01 0.01 0.17
Condition*Prior context*Familiarity 0.01 0.03 0.75
Condition*Prior context*Executive control −0.01 0.03 0.70
Condition*Familiarity*Executive control 0.02 0.02 0.22
Prior context*Familiarity*Executive control 0.03 0.02 0.15
Condition*Prior context*Familiarity*Exec. Control −0.01 0.03 0.86
Control predictors b SE p
(Intercept) 5.60 0.03 0.00*
Random effects Variance
Subject 0.0233
Item 0.0074
Residual 0.1405
*p ≤ 0.05.
of their metaphoric vs. literal uses, leading to no differences in
Verb GD on the verbs as a function of whether they were intended
metaphorically or literally.
We also found an interaction between executive control and
presence of a prior context, which did not interact with con-
dition (b = −0.04, SE = 0.02, p < 0.05). This effect indicated
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FIGURE 2 | Verb GD partial effects as a function of prior context and
executive control after removing the effects of condition and
familiarity, and between-subject and between-item variance. Error
bands show 95% confidence intervals.
that readers with higher executive control read verbs more slowly
when there was a prior context, across both metaphorical and
literal sentences; In contrast, readers with low executive control
showed no difference in Verb GD as a function of prior context
(see the partial effects plot in Figure 2). This suggests that readers
with high executive control expended more effort to commit to a
particular interpretation of the verb at the point of the verb, while
readers with low executive control did not.
Metaphor TRT
The models fit to Metaphor TRT included a covariate for char-
acter length (continuous) because metaphor length, unlike verb
length, varied across sentences with metaphoric vs. literal verb
use (e.g., model flitted vs. butterfly flitted). Extreme outliers were
once again removed (Metaphor TRT< 80ms or> 4000ms), leav-
ing 94.5% of the observations. Log likelihoodmodel comparisons
showed that by-subject and by-item random slopes were war-
ranted for condition and prior context and were thus included.
Subject-averaged (F1) means broken down by metaphor condi-
tion, familiarity ratio, and context are presented in Figure 3.
As seen in Table 4, there was a two-way interaction between
context and condition (b = −0.09, SE = 0.05, p = 0.05), and a
three-way interaction between condition, context, and executive
control (b = 0.08, SE = 0.04, p = 0.05; see the partial effects plot
in Figure 4). To determine the source of the three-way interac-
tion, we ran sub-models split by trials where there was a prior
context and when there was not a prior context. In the model fit
to the data without a prior context, there was only a main effect
of condition (b = 0.13, SE = 0.04, p < 0.001). In the model fit
to the data with a prior context, there was a trend for an inter-
action between condition and executive control which did not
reach significance (b = 0.04, SE = 0.03, p = 0.11). In addition to
this sub-model, we also ran sub-models split by condition (i.e.,
metaphor or literal sentences); the model for the metaphor sen-
tences showed a main effect for context (b = −0.08, SE = 0.04,
p = 0.05).
FIGURE 3 | Context and familiarity subject-averaged (F1) mean reading
times (ms) for Metaphor TRT. Error bars show standard error of the mean.
Taken together, the trends observed in the follow-up analy-
ses suggest that the best interpretation of the original three-way
interaction is that participants with high executive control read
metaphors as quickly as literal sentences when there was a prior
supportive context. In all other cases, all people read metaphors
more slowly than literal sentences. This Metaphor TRT find-
ing is compatible with the one reported above for Verb GD, in
that they together suggest that participants with high executive
control spent more time reading the verb following a prior con-
text, thus, their efforts toward contextual integration occurred
earlier than that found for participants with low executive
control.
Regression probability into prior context
Given the differences between readers with high and low execu-
tive control in Metaphor TRT as a function of prior context, we
wished to determine whether and how executive control related
to how people read the prior context word itself (e.g., unopened
in unopened textbooks snored). We thus calculated the probabil-
ity that readers would regress into the prior context word at
any point while reading the sentence, and analyzed these data
using a generalized LME model. As the model only evaluates data
from sentences that had prior contexts, it only included a three-
way interaction term for condition ∗executive control∗familiarity
ratio, unlike the verb and metaphor region models above. Log
likelihood model comparisons showed that random slopes were
not warranted in this model.
As seen in Table 5, and consistent with the idea that low
executive control readers semantically committed to a particu-
lar context-driven interpretation of the verb after the first pass,
we found a significant interaction for condition∗executive con-
trol (b = 0.31, SE = 0.16, p = 0.05). This interaction indicated
that readers with low executive control had a considerably higher
probability of regressing into the prior context, and particularly
when they were reading a metaphor sentence rather than a literal
sentence (i.e., textbooks snored rather than sailors snored; see the
partial effects plot in Figure 5).
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Table 4 | Effect sizes (b), standard errors (SE ), and p-values for the
metaphor total reading time logistic LME model.
Fixed effects Metaphor total
reading time
b SE p
Condition 0.09 0.03 0.01*
Prior context −0.03 0.03 0.29
Familiarity ratio (scaled) −0.01 0.02 0.50
Executive control score (scaled) 0.06 0.05 0.21
Condition*Prior context −0.09 0.05 0.05*
Condition*Familiarity −0.04 0.03 0.19
Prior context*Familiarity 0.01 0.02 0.82
Condition*Executive control 0.01 0.02 0.66
Prior context*Executive control 0.00 0.03 0.99
Familiarity*Executive control −0.01 0.01 0.30
Condition*Prior context*Familiarity −0.01 0.04 0.74
Condition*Prior context*Executive control 0.08 0.04 0.05*
Condition*Familiarity*Executive control 0.01 0.02 0.62
Prior context*Familiarity*Executive control −0.02 0.02 0.44
Condition*Prior context*Familiarity*Exec. control −0.03 0.04 0.42
Control predictors b SE p
(Intercept) 6.49 0.05 0.00*
Noun length (scaled) 0.07 0.02 0.00*
Random effects Variance
Subject 0.0917
Subject|Condition 0.0000
Subject|Prior context 0.0143
Subject|Condition|Prior context 0.0222
Item 0.0187
Item|Condition 0.0409
Item|Prior context 0.0097
Item|Condition|Prior context 0.0186
Residual 0.1639
*p ≤ 0.05.
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 1, we examined whether domain-general executive
control related to how people read verbs used metaphorically or
literally as a function of familiarity and prior context. We found
that readers with high but not low executive control took the prior
context into account at the point of the verb on the first pass:
They exhibited longer Verb GD when a prior context occurred,
irrespective ofmetaphor familiarity. Interestingly, although famil-
iarity speeded Verb GD generally, this general facilitative effect
of familiarity did not interact with prior context or executive
control.
With respect to later reading measures, however, executive
control did interact with condition and context. In terms of
Metaphor TRT, people with high executive control showed longer
reading times for metaphorical vs. literally intended verbs when
there was a prior context. In contrast, people with low execu-
tive control did not show this difference, rather they were slower
across the board for metaphors. Readers with low executive
FIGURE 4 | Metaphor TRT partial effects as a function of condition and
executive control in sentences with (A) No Prior Context and with (B)
Prior Context after removing the effects of familiarity and noun length,
and between-subject and between-item variance. Error bands show
95% confidence intervals.
Table 5 | Effect sizes (b), standard errors (SE ), and p-values for the
regression into prior context generalized LME model.
Fixed effects Regression probability
into prior context
b SE p
Condition −0.03 0.15 0.85
Familiarity ratio 0.12 0.11 0.25
Executive control score (scaled) 0.40 0.19 0.03*
Condition*Familiarity −0.13 0.17 0.44
Condition*Executive control 0.31 0.16 0.05*
Familiarity*Executive control 0.06 0.09 0.54
Condition*Familiarity*Executive control −0.13 0.18 0.47
Control predictors b SE p
(Intercept) −1.08 0.20 0.00*
Context length (scaled) 0.01 0.09 0.89
Random effects Variance
Subject 1.0436
Item 0.2040
Residual n/a
*p ≤ 0.05.
control were also more likely than those with high executive con-
trol to regress back into the context word, suggesting that they
had to work harder to make sense of the sentence after it had been
fully read and the intended meaning became clear. Thus, when
the context biased a particular interpretation (e.g., unopened text-
books snored), people with high but not low executive control
spent more time reading the metaphorical verb, presumably to
semantically commit to the contextually appropriate interpreta-
tion on the first pass. Further, they spent less time rereading
both the metaphorical regions of the sentence (e.g., textbooks
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snored) or regressing to the biased context word (e.g., unopened).
Consequently, readers with high executive control displayed a
more efficient reading strategy by integrating contextual cues as
they occurred on the first pass, whereas readers with low executive
control were less likely to do so.
While the overall pattern of metaphor data is relatively clear,
one open question is whether a similar pattern of executive func-
tion interactions occurs for other forms of figurative language,
such as idiomatic expressions, that have fewer on-line compre-
hension demands. Idiomatic expressions, like metaphors, have
figurative meanings that can be more or less familiar (e.g., kick
the bucket, which is familiar in English and figuratively means
“to die”; bore his cross, which is known but less familiar in
English and figuratively means to “accept one’s burden in life”).
However, unlike the metaphors used in Experiment 1, the com-
ponent words of idioms have a high likelihood of co-occurring,
independent of what meaning is intended (Wulff, 2008). The
implication of this difference between idioms and metaphors is
that encountering the initial words of an idiom (e.g., kick the. . . )
may enable people to strongly anticipate their completion (e.g.,
bucket), particularly when idioms are highly familiar. This early
anticipation of idiom-final words might in turn enable a head
start on semantic processing (Cacciari and Tabossi, 1988; Titone
and Connine, 1994), such that the interpretive demands faced
when one ultimately encounters an idiom-final word are reduced.
FIGURE 5 | Regression Probability into Prior Context partial effects as a
function of condition and executive control after removing the effects
of familiarity and adjective length, and between-subject and
between-item variance. Error bands show 95% confidence intervals.
In this way, idioms might differ from the situation engendered by
metaphors (particularly those included in Experiment 1), where
there is no basis upon which to anticipate a figuratively biased
verb at a lexical level (e.g., The unopened textbooks snored), even
in the condition where the context is semantically consistent with
a metaphorical interpretation of the verb.
Thus, in Experiment 2, we examined whether the presumed
lexical boost afforded idioms compared to metaphors would
reduce the overall demands of comprehension, and result in a pat-
tern of data where the same participants in Experiment 1, who
showed executive control dependencies for metaphors, would fail
to show such dependencies for idioms randomly interspersed in
the same experimental set. Of note, because the set of idiomatic
sentences included in Experiment 2 were not initially intended to
serve this purpose, they are not perfectly comparable in a point
for point sense, thus it is not readily possible to statistically com-
pare differences across Experiments 1 and 2. However, qualitative
comparison of data patterns across Experiments 1 and 2 may be
useful for informing future research efforts that directly compare
metaphors to idioms using methods and materials deliberately
intended to do so.
EXPERIMENT 2: IDIOM PROCESSING AND EXECUTIVE
CONTROL
METHOD
Participants
The participants were the same individuals who completed
Experiment 1.
Stimuli
We created sentences containing idioms that all had the same
verb-determiner-noun structure: Subject noun, verb, determiner,
object noun, and disambiguating context (Roxy bit her lip and
tried to keep the plans for the surprise party a secret). Like
Experiment 1, we had two regions of interest, Idiom-final noun
GD and Idiom TRT, the former reflecting early or first-pass
comprehension, and the latter reflecting later or second-pass
comprehension.
Each sentence contained an idiom or matched literal phrase,
followed by a disambiguating context, which forced a particu-
lar interpretation of the idiom. There were three conditions, as
seen in Table 6 below. In one condition, idioms were followed
by a context that biased the idiom’s figurative meaning (Id-Id).
In a second condition, idioms were followed by a context that
biased the idiom’s literal meaning (Id-Lit). In the control con-
dition, a matched literal phrase was always followed by a literal
Table 6 | Example low and high familiar sentences from idiom-idiom, idiom-literal, and literal-literal conditions.
Condition Sentence
Idiom phrase in idiomatic context—Low familiar Josh bore his cross the entire flight and didn’t complain about the snoring man
Idiom phrase in literal context—Low familiar Josh bore his cross down the center aisle of the church during the passion play
Matched literal phrase in literal context Josh lost his cross when he dropped it in the grass onthe way home from church
Idiom phrase in idiomatic context—High familiar Roxy bit her lip and tried to keep the plans for the surprise party a secret
Idiom phrase in literal context—High familiar Roxy bit her lip as she rushed through breakfast in a hurry to get to school
Matched literal phrase in literal context Roxy cut her lip on a branch when she climbed too high up the cedar tree
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Table 7 | Means and standard deviations for familiarity and executive
function in Experiment 2, split by median.
Variable Mean Min Max SD
Low familiarity (item rating) 2.67 1.67 3.23 0.45
High familiarity (item rating) 4. 08 3.37 4.80 0.39
Low executive control (cost score in ms) 119 35 339 83
High executive control (cost score in ms) −19 −105 31 41
context (Lit-Lit). The stimulus set consisted of 54 idioms that
were selected from a larger set of well-normed idioms (Libben
and Titone, 2008), which included familiarity ratings on 5-point
scale (1 = I never or almost never encounter the idiom, and 5 = I
encounter the idiom frequently).
Apparatus
Same as Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1 because the
idiom sentences analyzed here were randomly intermixed in the
metaphor set reported in Experiment 1. For the idiom sentences,
participants viewed one of six counterbalanced lists. There were
54 target sentences in each list. An idiom or its literal control,
but not both, appeared once in a given list in only one condi-
tion. Thus, if a participant viewed the idiom Roxy bit her lip and
tried to keep the plans for the surprise party a secret in the Id-Id
condition, s/he would not see that idiom in the Id-Lit condi-
tion (Roxy bit her lip as she rushed through breakfast in a hurry
to get to school), or its matched literal control in the Lit-Lit condi-
tion (Roxy cut her lip as she rushed through breakfast in a hurry
to get to school). No participant saw any sentence more than
once.
RESULTS
Overall comprehension accuracy was 94.5%, indicating that par-
ticipants were attentive during the experiment.
The same fixed effect structure was applied to each eye move-
ment measure (i.e., Noun GD and Idiom TRT). The fixed effect
structure included a three-way interaction term for familiar-
ity (continuous)∗executive control (continuous)∗condition (Id-
Id, Id-Lit or Lit-Lit; deviation coded). As in Experiment 1,
the continuous predictors were scaled, maximum correlations
(all < 0.28) showed minimal effects of collinearity, and ran-
dom intercepts were included for subjects and items. For ease
of data interpretation, we present the means and standard devi-
ations for all continuous factors in Table 7, with familiarity
categorized into high and low with a median split, and the
executive control means and standard deviations repeated from
Experiment 1.
Noun GD
There were no significant interactions or main effects of idiomatic
condition. Thus, idiom-final words were read equally fast in all
experimental conditions. As well, there were no interactions with
executive control.
FIGURE 6 | Familiarity subject-averaged (F1) mean reading times (ms)
for Idiom TRT. Error bars equal standard error of the mean.
Idiom TRT
A covariate was added for idiom length.We removed extreme out-
liers (Idiom TRT < 80ms or > 4000ms), retaining 95.13% of
the total observations. Log likelihoodmodel comparisons showed
that by-subject and by-item random slopes were supported for
condition in the model. Subject-averaged (F1) means broken
down by condition and familiarity are presented in Figure 6.
As seen in Table 8, we found a significant interaction of condi-
tion by familiarity (b = −0.12, SE = 0.04, p < 0.05), indicating
that readers had shorter total reading times for high familiar Id-
Id phrases (e.g., Roxy bit her lip and tried to keep the plans for
the surprise party a secret) compared to their reading times for
low familiar Id-Id phrases (e.g., Josh bore his cross the entire flight
and didn’t complain about the snoring man) (see the partial effects
plot in Figure 7). There was no such interaction with familiar-
ity for the Id-Lit contrast in this model. Moreover, a treatment
coded model with Lit-Lit as the baseline showed an interaction
with familiarity for Lit-Lit vs. Id-Id (b = −0.12, SE = 0.04, p <
0.05), but not Lit-Lit vs. Id-Lit (p > 0.20), but a relevelled model
with Id-Id as the baseline showed a trend for an interaction with
familiarity for Id-Id vs. Id-Lit (b = 0.06, SE = 0.03, p = 0.06).
These interactions are shown in Figure 7. No other effect was
significant.
To better locate the source of the familiarity interactions, we
computed treatment coded sub-models split into low and high
familiarity sentences with Id-Id as the baseline to compare Id-
Id vs. Id-Lit and Lit-Lit (since the significant differences in the
preceding analyses only involved Id-Id). The model fit to high
familiar phrases showed that readers had faster Idiom TRT for
Id-Id sentences than for Lit-Lit sentences (b = 0.16, SE = 0.06,
p < 0.05). No other effects were significant. Thus, of note, there
were no interactions with executive control.
DISCUSSION
Experiment 2 investigated whether idiom processing was modu-
lated by individual differences in executive control for the same
participants tested in Experiment 1. Our results show that high
familiar idioms had shorter total reading times than matched lit-
eral phrases when the sentence was ultimately biased toward an
idiomatic interpretation. Finally, of relevance to our question of
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Table 8 | Effect sizes (b), standard errors (SE ), and Pr (>|t|) values for
the idiom total Reading time logistic LME model.
Fixed effects Idiom total reading
time
b SE p
Condition (Id-Id) −0.03 0.05 0.54
Condition (Id-Lit) 0.00 0.05 0.95
Familiarity (scaled) −0.03 0.02 0.22
Executive control score (scaled) 0.05 0.05 0.30
Condition (Id-Id)*Familiarity −0.12 0.04 0.01*
Condition (Id-Lit)*Familiarity 0.01 0.04 0.87
Condition (Id-Id)*Executive control 0.06 0.05 0.20
Condition (Id-Lit)*Executive control −0.03 0.04 0.49
Familiarity*Executive control −0.01 0.01 0.37
Condition (Id-Id)*Familiarity*Exec. control 0.00 0.04 0.96
Condition (Id-Lit)*Familiarity*Exec. control −0.03 0.04 0.38
Control predictors b SE p
(Intercept) 6.58 0.05 0.00*
Idiom length (scaled) 0.07 0.02 0.00*
Random effects Variance
Subject 0.0879
Subject|Condition (Id-Id) 0.0310
Subject|Condition (Id-Lit) 0.0147
Item 0.0155
Item|Condition (Id-Id) 0.0225
Item|Condition (Id-Lit) 0.0189
Residual 0.1604
*p ≤ 0.05.
interest, individual differences in executive control never inter-
acted with any reading measure.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We used eye movement measures of sentence reading to deter-
mine whether familiarity and context modulates metaphor pro-
cessing as a function of individual differences in executive control.
We also assessed how the relationship between individual differ-
ences in executive control and comprehension extended qualita-
tively to idiom processing for the same participants. There were
three key findings.
The first key finding was that, in Experiment 1, relative
familiarity of a metaphorical vs. literal interpretation of the
verb modulated how much time people spent reading the verb
on the first pass (see Figure 1). Of note, this effect occurred
irrespective of prior context or individual differences in exec-
utive control. Accordingly, when metaphor familiarity was low,
Verb GD was slower for verbs intended metaphorically than for
verbs intended literally. This difference decreased as metaphor
familiarity increased (relative to familiarity of the verb’s literal
interpretation). This suggests that when people encounter verbs
intended metaphorically, immediate comprehension is slowed
if the metaphorical meaning of the verb is less familiar. The
slowing of immediate comprehension potentially reflects some
FIGURE 7 | Idiom TRT partial effects as a function of condition and
familiarity after removing the effects of idiom length and executive
control. Error bands show 95% confidence intervals. Id-Id is separately
contrasted with Lit-Lit in (A) and with Id-Lit in (B) so that the difference
between Id-Id and Lit-Lit is clear, which is otherwise masked by the error
bands for Id-Lit (There was no difference between Lit-Lit and Id-Lit).
combination of the time necessary for inhibiting the more famil-
iar literal interpretation of the verb, and for generating or
retrieving from memory the verb’s metaphorical sense.
Our second key finding involvedmetaphors and executive con-
trol in Experiment 1. Specifically, when people encountered a
metaphorically or literally intended verb following a prior con-
text that supported whichever interpretation of that verb, readers
with high executive control spent more time fixating the verb on
the first pass, presumably to immediately integrate the appro-
priate meaning with the prior context. In contrast, readers with
low executive control did not spend extra time fixating the verb
under the same circumstances. They consequently experienced
comprehension difficulty later on in the sentence, as indicated by
longer total reading times of the metaphor region, and a higher
likelihood of regressing back to the context word, particularly
in the metaphorically biased condition. Thus, these results sug-
gest that high and low executive control readers differed in the
rapidity with which they used context to interpret the verb on
the first pass, and this difference propagated to later portions
of the sentence: High executive control readers made immedi-
ate semantic commitments, whereas low executive control readers
delayed their semantic commitments pending subsequent disam-
biguating parts of the sentence (see also Frazier and Rayner, 1990;
Pickering and Frisson, 2001, for related work on single-word
lexical ambiguity).
Our third key finding involves the role of executive control in
idiom processing (Experiment 2). Unlike the global pattern found
for metaphor processing, individual differences in executive con-
trol did not modulate reading times for idioms in Experiment 2,
despite the fact that idiom reading times were affected by idiom
familiarity (albeit measured in a very different way than it was for
metaphors in Experiment 1). Specifically, high familiar idioms in
sentences that had a subsequent idiom context had shorter total
reading times for the idiom region than both matched controls
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and low familiar idioms. This suggests that when an idiom was
familiar, people were more likely to entertain its figurative mean-
ing and consequently were less likely to revisit the idiom on the
second pass, presumably because the initial semantic commit-
ment made to the figurative interpretation of the phrase was
confirmed by subsequent context.
Of note, figurative condition had no significant first-pass
effects for gaze duration on idiom-final nouns, unlike the pat-
tern found for metaphor-final verbs, where all readers showed
longer gaze durations when there was no prior context and the
verb was figuratively intended. This suggests that the global effort
needed to resolve a semantic commitment on the first pass is
generally reduced for idioms compared to metaphors, perhaps
due to the fact that relatively common idiomatic expressions
enjoy a lexical boost due to the high co-occurrence of their com-
ponent words (Wulff, 2008). Thus, it is possible that idioms
are so thoroughly lexicalized for native speakers of a language
(even ones that are rated as low familiar) that people can par-
tially anticipate their final words and thus get a head start on
processing those words lexically and semantically (Cacciari and
Tabossi, 1988; Titone and Connine, 1994; Libben and Titone,
2008). This state of affairs may be especially true for natu-
ral reading contexts, such as in the current study, where early
anticipation of idiom-final words may be enhanced by some
amount of parafoveal processing of upcoming words (Kliegl
et al., 2007; Hohenstein et al., 2010; Angele et al., 2013). While
parafoveal processing of words was also certainly possible for the
metaphors in Experiment 1, these metaphors do not likely enjoy
the same lexicalized, collocation status as idioms. Thus, readers
may not have been as able to extract useful parafoveal informa-
tion for metaphors that would enable a meaningful head start on
processing.
In summary, the results suggest that general cognitive capac-
ities, such as executive control, are important for processing
metaphors during natural sentence reading. The results also sug-
gest that not all elements of figurative language may incur the
same executive control demands as metaphors. Specifically, exec-
utive control demands for idioms during natural reading may
differ because idioms are generally more familiar both lexically
and semantically compared to metaphorical language. Thus, the
results of the present study, while preliminary, suggest that fur-
ther comparison of metaphors and idioms is a potentially fruitful
avenue of inquiry.
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